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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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1944: A Year <strong>of</strong> Investigations 437<br />

until December 14. Hawaii was then a territory, not yet a state.<br />

With the secretary out <strong>of</strong> the country, Undersecretary James V.<br />

Forrestal became acting secretary. Forrestal had known nothing<br />

<strong>of</strong> “Purple” <strong>and</strong> had not been privy to MAGIC. On assuming<br />

the responsibilities <strong>of</strong> secretary, he asked to be briefed. Th erefore,<br />

apparently on orders <strong>of</strong> Admiral Noyes, director <strong>of</strong> naval communications,<br />

Lieutenant Comm<strong>and</strong>er Kramer, Japanese translator<br />

<strong>and</strong> Navy courier, assembled for Forrestal a special folder <strong>of</strong><br />

intercepts <strong>and</strong> other papers “relative to the break in diplomatic<br />

relations with Japan.” 52 Because <strong>of</strong> Saff ord’s familiarity with the<br />

traffi c, Kramer had gone over the folder with Saff ord to check for<br />

completeness. 53 Th en both Comm<strong>and</strong>er McCollum <strong>of</strong> Far East<br />

intelligence <strong>and</strong> Kramer briefed Forrestal, “explaining the signifi -<br />

cance <strong>of</strong> the various messages” 54 <strong>and</strong> “the way things shaped up<br />

from this traffi c.” 55<br />

When Knox returned <strong>and</strong> Forrestal was relieved <strong>of</strong> his position<br />

as Acting Secretary, his bundle <strong>of</strong> intercepts must have been<br />

tossed in a safe <strong>and</strong> forgotten.<br />

Court Martial Deadline Extended<br />

Th e tides <strong>of</strong> war had shifted by this time. Th e Allies were<br />

preparing to launch a second front in Europe. Th e Axis powers<br />

were on the defensive both in Europe <strong>and</strong> in Asia. Many people,<br />

Republicans <strong>and</strong> some anti-New Deal Democrats, were beginning<br />

to ask why, after all this time, it was still necessary to maintain<br />

secrecy about the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> attack. Why couldn’t the<br />

truth be told? Was the administration trying to hide something?<br />

52 Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 8, p. 3689, Saff ord testimony<br />

before the Joint Committee. At the time, Saff ord was under the impression the<br />

folder <strong>of</strong> intercepts was being assembled for the use <strong>of</strong> the Roberts Commission.<br />

53 Ibid., part 36, p. 71, Saff ord testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.<br />

54 Ibid., part 36, p. 71, Saff ord testimony.<br />

55 Ibid., pp. 83–84, Kramer testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.

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