Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
1944: A Year of Investigations 435 Hart: Was any of the foregoing information, under dates of November and December, 1941, disseminated by the main Washington unit direct to the corresponding unit in Fourteenth Naval District [Hawaii]? Saff ord: No, sir. Th at was not permitted by a written order then in force; but there was one exception. On the 3rd of December, I prepared OpNav Secret Dispatch 031855. . . . In sending this information, I was overstepping the bounds as established by approved war plans and joint agreement between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence. Th is information was sent to Manila for action and it was routed to Pearl Harbor for information. 46 It reported the Japanese government’s orders to its emissaries throughout the world to destroy their codes and code machines. 47 Hawaii could not possibly have gained this information through their own eff orts. Th e dissemination of such intelligence was the duty, responsibility, and privilege of the Offi ce of Naval Intelligence, not of Saff ord’s Communications Intelligence Unit. 48 Th is was Saff ord’s fi rst testimony before a Pearl Harbor investigation; he had not been asked to testify before the Roberts Commission. His revelations were startling. No one appearing before Roberts had hinted at the availability of such intelligence as Saff ord described. And of the Washington witnesses questioned by Hart, only Turner and Ingersoll had said anything that might have been interpreted as referring to the Japanese intercepts. Saff ord appeared to know what he was talking about, but he was unable to produce copies of any of the Japanese messages to support his testimony. Almost three years had passed since he had actually seen any of the intercepts he was describing. How 46Ibid., p. 392. 47Ibid., part 14, p. 1408, Saff ord’s Top Secret dispatch of December 3. 48 Ibid., part 26, pp. 392–93.
436 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy much, if any, of Saff ord’s detailed testimony could be believed? Saff ord’s memory could be playing tricks on him. * * * * * Secretary of Navy Knox died suddenly of a heart attack on April 28, 1944, while the Hart Inquiry was in progress. James V. Forrestal, then undersecretary of Navy, was sworn in as his successor on May 19. 49 Hart concluded his inquiry on June 15 and adjourned “to await the action of the convening authority.” 50 Th e testimony of witnesses was recorded and submitted with the several documents and exhibits introduced to Forrestal. Safford Finds the Missing Intercepts After testifying at the Hart Inquiry, Saff ord continued his search for the intercepts. But he was unsuccessful; all copies seemed to have disappeared. Saff ord was mystifi ed. Finally someone told him about a packet of papers in a Navy safe labeled “P.H.” Perhaps that contained the documents he was looking for. It did! It contained an almost complete set of the missing Japanese intercepts. Saff ord then had copies made and restored to the fi les. 51 No one has ever been able to explain how the four original copies of each intercept produced for the government’s Army and Navy permanent fi les and held under tight security had been lost or destroyed. Apparently this one set of intercepts survived because of a series of coincidences. On December 9, almost immediately after the attack, Navy Secretary Knox fl ew to Hawaii to investigate the damage done by the Japanese. He didn’t return 49 Walter Millis, ed., Th e Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. xxiii. Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26. 50 Ibid., pp. 471–72. 51 Saff ord’s conversations with author; notes in author’s fi les.
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436 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />
much, if any, <strong>of</strong> Saff ord’s detailed testimony could be believed?<br />
Saff ord’s memory could be playing tricks on him.<br />
* * * * *<br />
Secretary <strong>of</strong> Navy Knox died suddenly <strong>of</strong> a heart attack on<br />
April 28, 1944, while the Hart Inquiry was in progress. James V.<br />
Forrestal, then undersecretary <strong>of</strong> Navy, was sworn in as his successor<br />
on May 19. 49<br />
Hart concluded his inquiry on June 15 <strong>and</strong> adjourned “to<br />
await the action <strong>of</strong> the convening authority.” 50 Th e testimony <strong>of</strong><br />
witnesses was recorded <strong>and</strong> submitted with the several documents<br />
<strong>and</strong> exhibits introduced to Forrestal.<br />
Safford Finds the Missing Intercepts<br />
After testifying at the Hart Inquiry, Saff ord continued his<br />
search for the intercepts. But he was unsuccessful; all copies<br />
seemed to have disappeared. Saff ord was mystifi ed. Finally someone<br />
told him about a packet <strong>of</strong> papers in a Navy safe labeled<br />
“P.H.” Perhaps that contained the documents he was looking<br />
for. It did! It contained an almost complete set <strong>of</strong> the missing<br />
Japanese intercepts. Saff ord then had copies made <strong>and</strong> restored<br />
to the fi les. 51<br />
No one has ever been able to explain how the four original<br />
copies <strong>of</strong> each intercept produced for the government’s Army<br />
<strong>and</strong> Navy permanent fi les <strong>and</strong> held under tight security had been<br />
lost or destroyed. Apparently this one set <strong>of</strong> intercepts survived<br />
because <strong>of</strong> a series <strong>of</strong> coincidences. On December 9, almost immediately<br />
after the attack, Navy Secretary Knox fl ew to Hawaii to<br />
investigate the damage done by the Japanese. He didn’t return<br />
49 Walter Millis, ed., Th e Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p.<br />
xxiii. Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 26.<br />
50 Ibid., pp. 471–72.<br />
51 Saff ord’s conversations with author; notes in author’s fi les.