Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

434 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of
war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m.
(Washington time) that date.
Before that message was presented to the secretary of the Navy,
Kramer appended a note to the eff ect that “1:00 p.m. Washington
time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the
Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor
in about three hours.” 42
According to Saff ord, two specifi c messages received in
Washington before the attack gave pretty clear indications that
Japan intended to declare war on the United States. Th e “Winds
Message,” intercepted December 4, was “regarded . . . as defi nitely
committing the Japanese Government to war with the United
States and Britain.” 43 And the message received in the evening of
December 6 constituted “positive information that Japan would
declare war against the United States, at a time to be specifi ed
thereafter.” 44
Hart: Is there any documentary report which shows the date
and hour of delivery of the foregoing information to various
offi cials?
Saff ord: Th ere is no documentary evidence.
Saff ord was testifying, he said, on the basis of his “recollection
of Lieutenant Commander Kramer’s verbal reports.” 45 Records of
all the Japanese intercepts had been made and fi led at the time,
but in 1944 Saff ord could fi nd no copies whatsoever.
42 Ibid., p. 390, italics added.
43 Ibid., p. 394.
44 Ibid., p. 390.
45 Ibid., p. 391.