Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
1944: A Year of Investigations 433 Southwest Pacifi c would begin on that date, because, at that time Hawaii was out of our minds. 38 On December 1 U.S. offi cials learned that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States. Th en on December 4 we “received defi nite information . . . that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia.” 39 At 9:00 p.m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specifi ed thereafter. Th is information was positive and unmistakable and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time. 40 Because this information was so important, it “was distributed as a rush job by Lieutenant Commander Kramer.” Much of the December 6 information was distributed over the telephone by Admiral Wilkinson and by Secretary Hull. Th e following offi cials were given this information that night: President Roosevelt (via the White House Aide), Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, Rear Admiral Turner, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Rear Admiral Beardall. Lieutenant Colonel R.S. Bratton, U.S. Army, was given the same information at 9:00 p.m. [December 6] for dissemination to War Department offi cials, and we did not know any more, except that he got a copy over to Secretary Hull by 10:00. 41 Finally, at 10:15 a.m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence 38Ibid., p. 390. 39Ibid. 40Ibid. 41Ibid., pp. 390–92.
434 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time) that date. Before that message was presented to the secretary of the Navy, Kramer appended a note to the eff ect that “1:00 p.m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in about three hours.” 42 According to Saff ord, two specifi c messages received in Washington before the attack gave pretty clear indications that Japan intended to declare war on the United States. Th e “Winds Message,” intercepted December 4, was “regarded . . . as defi nitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain.” 43 And the message received in the evening of December 6 constituted “positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specifi ed thereafter.” 44 Hart: Is there any documentary report which shows the date and hour of delivery of the foregoing information to various offi cials? Saff ord: Th ere is no documentary evidence. Saff ord was testifying, he said, on the basis of his “recollection of Lieutenant Commander Kramer’s verbal reports.” 45 Records of all the Japanese intercepts had been made and fi led at the time, but in 1944 Saff ord could fi nd no copies whatsoever. 42 Ibid., p. 390, italics added. 43 Ibid., p. 394. 44 Ibid., p. 390. 45 Ibid., p. 391.
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1944: A Year <strong>of</strong> Investigations 433<br />
Southwest Pacifi c would begin on that date, because, at that<br />
time Hawaii was out <strong>of</strong> our minds. 38<br />
On December 1 U.S. <strong>of</strong>fi cials learned that Japan was going<br />
to attack Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States. Th en on December 4<br />
we “received defi nite information . . . that Japan would attack<br />
the United States <strong>and</strong> Britain, but would maintain peace with<br />
Russia.” 39<br />
At 9:00 p.m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received<br />
positive information that Japan would declare war against the<br />
United States, at a time to be specifi ed thereafter. Th is information<br />
was positive <strong>and</strong> unmistakable <strong>and</strong> was made available<br />
to Military Intelligence at this same time. 40<br />
Because this information was so important, it “was distributed as<br />
a rush job by Lieutenant Comm<strong>and</strong>er Kramer.”<br />
Much <strong>of</strong> the December 6 information was distributed over<br />
the telephone by Admiral Wilkinson <strong>and</strong> by Secretary Hull.<br />
Th e following <strong>of</strong>fi cials were given this information that night:<br />
President Roosevelt (via the White House Aide), Secretary<br />
Hull, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, Rear<br />
Admiral Turner, Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Rear Admiral<br />
Beardall. Lieutenant Colonel R.S. Bratton, U.S. Army, was<br />
given the same information at 9:00 p.m. [December 6] for dissemination<br />
to War Department <strong>of</strong>fi cials, <strong>and</strong> we did not know<br />
any more, except that he got a copy over to Secretary Hull by<br />
10:00. 41<br />
Finally, at 10:15 a.m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941,<br />
we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence<br />
38Ibid., p. 390.<br />
39Ibid. 40Ibid. 41Ibid., pp. 390–92.