Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

432 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
couldn’t prove and asked him to check the record before returning
to give formal testimony.
Saff ord returned to the Navy Department and looked for
the pertinent intercepts. But they were missing! Th erefore, when
Saff ord testifi ed formally before the Hart Inquiry on April 29,
1944, 37 he again spoke from memory and a few notes. However,
he was able to recall in considerable detail many of the important
Japanese dispatches that had been intercepted, deciphered,
translated, and read by top military and administration offi cials
in Washington before the attack.
As early as the spring of 1941 (May 22), they had received
“positive proof of Japanese plans for the conquest of Southeastern
Asia and the Southwest Pacifi c.” Further indications of Japan’s
plans for aggression in the southwest Pacifi c and against southeast
Asia were picked up in September and October. On November
4, we received information that Japan’s internal situation, both
political and economic, was so desperate as a result of the U.S.
embargo that the Japanese government had to distract popular
attention by a foreign war or by some bloodless diplomatic victory.
We learned on November 12 that the Japanese government
regarded November 25 as the deadline for negotiations then
being conducted in Washington. It was obvious that Japan was
preparing for off ensive military operations of some nature.
Th e pace of the urgent intercepts picked up toward the end of
November. On November 24, 1941, we learned that November
29 was
defi nitely the governing date for off ensive military operations
of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large
scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the
37 Ibid., p. 387.