Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1944: A Year of Investigations 431
Ingersoll testifi ed that the United States was “virtually at war
with Germany” in the Atlantic, although without benefi t of a war
declaration. 33 “It was felt that Germany was the principal enemy
to be disposed of fi rst.” 34 Nevertheless, Ingersoll said “We felt that
the war would be precipitated in the Pacifi c and that we would
only become involved in the war in the Atlantic as a result of war
in the Pacifi c.” As a matter of fact, eff orts had been made
to get our merchant vessels out of the Far East and out of the
other areas in the Pacifi c where they could be captured by the
Japanese. . . . [T]he Atlantic situation did not preoccupy our
attention to the exclusion of the Pacifi c. 35
Ingersoll had anticipated Japan would strike “without a declaration
of war.” But that her surprise attacks
would be made against the Philippines and Guam with possibly
raiding attacks on our outlying small islands to the westward
of Hawaii, and submarine attacks against our shipping
around Hawaii. . . . [He did] not recall anyone in Operations
representing to Admiral Stark that the war would be precipitated
by an air attack on Pearl Harbor. 36
Captain Safford’s Testimony
Captain Laurence F. Saff ord of the security (intelligence) section
of the Navy’s communications division, met informally with
Hart and related to him from memory some of the information
Washington had derived from decrypted Japanese intercepts before
the attack. Hart cautioned him against making statements he
33 Ibid., p. 469.
34 Ibid., p. 461.
35 Ibid., p. 470.
36 Ibid.