Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

430 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the mid-Pacifi c islands under Japanese control consisting of large
re-enforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions, and also construction
material with yard workmen and engineers. However,
naval intelligence assumed that “the major capital ship strength
remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the
carriers.” 29
Th e United States was keeping a close eye on the Japanese
ship movements, according to Wilkinson, because of the tentative
American-British agreement that “any movement beyond
certain geographical limits [100 degrees longitude, 10 degrees
north latitude] in Southeast Asia” would be considered as “a
casus belli for England and as a matter of grave concern for the
United States.” 30 Wilkinson said Turner believed, without specifi
c evidence, “that the Japanese would launch an attack on the
Philippines,” 31 where the U.S. Asiatic Fleet was based. Otherwise,
according to Wilkinson, U.S. territory did not appear directly
threatened.
Ingersoll told the inquiry that “While the Government could
not guarantee that we would enter the war if Japan attacked Great
Britain,” in line with the ABC Agreement, “they fully believed
that we would do so. In our conversations with the British,”
however,
we never could make a fi rm commitment that at any particular
time the United States would enter the war, for the reason that
unless we were attacked fi rst the Executive Department did
not have the power to put the Country into war. 32
29 Ibid., p. 303, quoting from ONI’s December 1, 1941 fortnightly summary of
international news, airmailed to all fl ag offi cers afl oat.
30 Ibid., p. 303.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 267.