Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

428 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Fleet. Not a bad performance for men who had never fi red a
shot in action and considering the number of guns engaged. 25
Bellinger, who had been commander of the Naval Base
Defense Air Force, thought it was “foolish to think that such a
skeletonized organization,” as the Pacifi c Fleet was then,
functioning on the basis of cooperation by the Navy and Army
Air Forces and set up to be put in motion by special orders or
by an emergency occurring, remaining practically non-existent
except during periodic drills, could go into action and function
eff ectively at the occurrence of an actual emergency. An organization
of this nature to be eff ective must function twentyfour
hours every day, and prior to an air raid not subsequent
thereto.
Bellinger testifi ed that he knew of “no man who, under the circumstances,
could have done more” than Kimmel did. 26
Admiral Halsey pointed out that the problem was one of
balancing security against training and how far he could aff ord
to let his trained men go and still have his Fleet ready for instant
action. He was constantly going over in his mind how far this
should go. . . . [Kimmel] was very much against the transfer of
so many trained men and the infl ux of so many recruits under
the conditions that faced us. 27
Kimmel’s task as commander-in-chief was a juggling act. In the
light of his orders and available intelligence, he had to weigh the
relative importance of training against that of preparations for
war; he did not dare overemphasize one to the neglect of the
other.
25Ibid., pp. 193, 201. See also ibid., pp. 47, 65.
26Ibid., p. 140.
27Ibid., pp. 318–19.