Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1944: A Year of Investigations 427
Pacifi c Fleet had been materially reduced in order to strengthen
the forces in the Atlantic.” 21
Witness after witness pointed out that the planes and fl ight
crews available in Hawaii were clearly insuffi cient for long-range
surveillance. Commander Patrick C. Bellinger of Patrol Wing
Two estimated “an overall force of approximately 200 planes” (84
planes fl ying daily) and 252 crews would be required “to conduct
a search through 360 degrees, to a distance of at least 800 miles,
assuming a 15 mile radius of visibility.” 22 Given 25-mile visibility,
150 planes and 225 fl ight crews, fl ying 16½ hours per day, would
be needed to search a radius of 800 miles. Th e total of 24,750
plane-hours would consume 1,980,000 gallons of gasoline per
month and require an average of 82½ engine changes plus 182
spare engines per month. And still the eff ectiveness of the search
would be only about 50 per cent. 23 Th e Hawaiian Command then
had only 81 planes; nine were undergoing repair, 58 were in commission,
and 14 were in the air. However, because of physical
fatigue, about two crews are needed for every plane in operation,
and the number of fl ight crews in Hawaii on December 7 fell far
short of the number required. 24
Rear Admiral (commander at the time of the attack) Willard
A. Kitts, fl eet gunnery and training offi cer, U.S. Pacifi c Fleet, did
not think Kimmel was “unduly occupied with training matters to
the extent that he lost sight of the other aspects of readiness and
security.” He believed the success of the training in gunnery had
been
borne out by the splendid performance that the anti-aircraft
batteries of the Fleet put forth on the 7th of December. . . .
[A]t least twenty-eight planes were shot down by vessels of the
21 Ibid., p. 158.
22 Ibid., p. 124.
23 Ibid., p. 125.
24 Ibid., p. 123.