Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

426 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
and cooperate.” Admiral W.W. Smith, 17 Rear Admiral Walter S.
Anderson, commander, Battleships Battle Force, Pacifi c Fleet, 18
and Admiral William F. Halsey, commander Aircraft Battle
Force and Task Force Two at the time of the attack, all said that
their relations were excellent. “Admiral Kimmel . . . personally,
spent a great deal of time socially with General Short. In golf, and
other forms of exercise. . . . Th is enabled them to discuss things in
an informal way.” But Army-Navy cooperation was common in
Hawaii. “At this time, there were many Army offi cers that went to
sea with the task forces to obtain a fi rst-hand knowledge of what
the Navy was doing. At the same time, many naval offi cers went
on maneuvers with the Army.” 19
Witness after witness supported Kimmel’s claim that he had
been handicapped in opposing the Japanese air attack because
of too few planes and antiaircraft guns and insuffi cient personnel.
According to Admiral Smith, Kimmel had asked for men “so
many times that some members of the Staff advised him that he
was only boring the Department. . . . He would ask for 20,000
men; 10,000 to fi ll vacancies in the Fleet, and 10,000 more for
training . . . and the answer he invariably got was that, ‘Th e men
are not available. Th ey are needed in the Atlantic’.” 20
Vice Admiral William Satterlee Pye, commander at the
time of the attack of Battle Force, United States Pacifi c Fleet,
and commander of Task Force One, testifi ed about the June
1941 detachment of ships from the Pacifi c to the Atlantic: three
battleships, four light cruisers, one squadron of destroyers, and
other ships had been transferred earlier, so that “the power of the
17Ibid., p. 44.
18Ibid., pp. 434–35.
19Ibid., p. 331.
20Ibid., p. 47.