Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

424 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
page 1 of the Honolulu Advertiser read KURUSU BLUNTLY
WARNED NATION READY FOR BATTLE. Britishheld
Singapore was reported on the alert; all troops there had
been called to active duty. Th e Philippines were threatened by
Japanese encirclement. 10 War seemed likely. But all signs pointed
to its breaking out thousands of miles from Hawaii, possibly in
Singapore or the Philippines.
Hart questioned naval offi cers who had been at Pearl Harbor
during the attack. Witness after witness confessed that he had
been no less surprised than Kimmel by the sudden air attack.
Practically all the information available to them had directed
their attention elsewhere. Generally speaking, they were supportive
of Kimmel’s pre-attack decisions and actions.
Rear Admiral W.W. Smith, Kimmel’s chief of staff in
December 1941, testifi ed that when he saw the December 3
dispatch concerning the burning of documents by the Japanese
at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and
London, he had little doubt that they were about to make a “hostile
move.” 11 We had been told that “heavy Japanese movements
were on the way to the southard [sic]. It did not occur to us,”
Smith testifi ed, “that the attack was coming in our direction.” 12
“We did expect a submarine attack . . . [but not] an air raid on
Pearl Harbor, although plans were made to meet one, as I have
said, by the stationing of ships and conditions of readiness.” 13
Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, who at the time of the
attack was serving as fl eet aviation offi cer of the Pacifi c Fleet,
had thought a surprise air attack was “possible.” But he had considered
it preventable only “by the most extensive searches and
eff orts” for which neither the planes nor the men necessary were
10 Honolulu Advertiser, November 30, 1941, p. 1.
11 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 26, p. 489, Dispatch #031850.
12 Ibid., p. 62.
13 Ibid., p. 73.