Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1942–1944 419
aroused by the injustice of the situation. In eff ect, Kimmel had
been dismissed from his position and pilloried because he had not
been sent the pre-attack information available in Washington.
In February 1944 Saff ord called on Kimmel in New York.
He told Kimmel that many Japanese messages had been intercepted
and deciphered prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. He
gave Kimmel “a verbal summary of their contents.” 26 From the
few notes he had made and from his memory, Saff ord related
much of the information that had been known in Washington
from reading those intercepts, information which would have
been invaluable to the Pearl Harbor commanders.
When he returned to Washington he sought to document his
statements. But he searched in vain. Th e crucial intercepts were
missing from the fi les!
On March 23, 1944, Kimmel asked Edward B. Hanify, a lawyer
in the same legal fi rm as Rugg to come on board also to assist
in his case. 27 Hanify promptly started work on the Kimmel case. 28
Kimmel would not let it die.
* * * * *
1944 became a year of inquiries and investigations. Lest some
individuals in the military who might have knowledge concerning
the attack became casualties of the war, the Hart Inquiry was set
up. Both the Army and Navy held separate, but concurrent, hearings.
Th ese hearings were supplemented by the follow-up Clarke,
Clausen, and Hewitt inquiries that extended into 1945. On the
grounds of military security, all these inquiries were conducted in
greatest secrecy behind closed doors, and their reports were not
released to the public.
26 Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, p. 129.
27 Ibid., p. ix.
28 Toland interview.