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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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418 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

Captain Safford Talks with Kimmel<br />

Captain Saff ord played a key role in the whole <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong><br />

picture, both before the attack <strong>and</strong> also afterwards during the<br />

investigations. He served with the Navy Department communications<br />

intelligence unit from May 1936 until after the attack. He<br />

had worked in radio intelligence <strong>and</strong> cryptology, the deciphering<br />

<strong>of</strong> codes. As chief <strong>of</strong> the communications security section <strong>of</strong> naval<br />

communications during the months preceding the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong><br />

attack, he was responsible for the security <strong>of</strong> the secret Japanese<br />

intercepts <strong>and</strong> for keeping them from reaching unauthorized<br />

h<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

In the fall <strong>of</strong> 1943 Saff ord, “by the direction <strong>and</strong> instruction<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Director <strong>of</strong> Naval Intelligence,” was under orders to work<br />

on “a history <strong>of</strong> radio intelligence from 1924 to 1941.” 24 Like<br />

most people in the country, Saff ord had believed that Kimmel<br />

had failed to fulfi ll adequately his responsibilities as fl eet comm<strong>and</strong>er,<br />

that he had been remiss in interpreting the intelligence<br />

<strong>and</strong> orders sent him <strong>and</strong> thus was partially culpable for the severe<br />

damage done to the fl eet during the Japanese attack.<br />

Because <strong>of</strong> his pre-<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> responsibilities, Saff ord<br />

expected that he would be called to testify in any Kimmel courtmartial<br />

proceedings that might be held. So, as he looked through<br />

the fi les for the historical research to which he was assigned,<br />

he started to review the pre-<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> situation also <strong>and</strong> to<br />

assemble material he would need as a witness. 25 To his amazement<br />

he discovered that the intelligence derived from the Japanese<br />

intercepts, which Saff ord’s section had decoded in the months<br />

before the attack, had not been forwarded to the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong><br />

comm<strong>and</strong>ers as he had assumed. When he realized this, he was<br />

24Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 8, p. 3601, Saff ord testimony<br />

before the Joint Committee.<br />

25Ibid., part 36, p. 69, Saff ord testimony before Hewitt Inquiry; reprinted in<br />

ibid., part 8, p. 3602.

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