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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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414 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

his knowledge <strong>and</strong> expertise, Rochefort became a victim <strong>of</strong> the<br />

post-attack personnel changes in intelligence; he was transferred<br />

out <strong>of</strong> cryptography in October 1942, 12 ordered to Washington,<br />

<strong>and</strong> assigned to comm<strong>and</strong> a fl oating drydock in San Francisco. 13<br />

In preparation for his new assignment, he was sent to New York<br />

to consult with the marine engineering fi rm <strong>of</strong> Frederick R.<br />

Harris, Inc.<br />

In New York, Rochefort encountered his old “boss,” Kimmel,<br />

who was then himself working on fl oating drydocks for the Harris<br />

fi rm. Rochefort told him what McCollum had reported about<br />

pre-attack knowledge in Washington. 14 Th us by a series <strong>of</strong> coincidences,<br />

Kimmel learned in late 1942 that crucial information<br />

about Japanese intentions had been available in Washington prior<br />

to the attack, which had not been relayed to him in <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>.<br />

Another responsible Navy <strong>of</strong>fi cer who left intelligence was<br />

Lieutenant Comm<strong>and</strong>er Alwin Dalton Kramer, a Japaneselanguage<br />

scholar. In late 1941, he had been in charge <strong>of</strong> the translation<br />

group <strong>of</strong> the communications security group in Washington.<br />

As Navy courier he had delivered many confi dential intercepts,<br />

including MAGIC, to top Navy <strong>of</strong>fi cers during the crucial weeks<br />

preceding the attack. In June 1943 Kramer was transferred to<br />

<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>. And in January 1944, he was ordered to sea duty in<br />

the South Pacifi c. 15<br />

Midway (New York Times, November 17, 1985; BBG). See Edwin T. Layton,<br />

Roger Pineau, <strong>and</strong> John Costello, And I Was Th ere: <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> <strong>and</strong> Midway—<br />

Breaking the Secrets (New York: W. Morrow, 1985), p. 464.<br />

12Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 10, pp. 4673, 4679, Rochefort<br />

testimony before the Joint Committee. Rochefort left <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> in October<br />

1942.<br />

13Layton, And I Was Th ere, p. 468 (BBG).<br />

14Saff ord, “Victims <strong>of</strong> the Kita Message,” pp. 50, 54.<br />

15Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 8, pp. 3894–95. According to<br />

Kramer’s testimony, he was on duty with Saff ord’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce from June 1940 to<br />

June 1943.

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