Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1942–1944 413
had recognized the seriousness of the Japanese threat prior to
the attack and had drafted messages to the Pacifi c commanders
warning of impending Japanese action. His superiors had watered
down his messages so much, however, that they failed to deliver the
sense of urgency McCollum had intended to convey. 9 McCollum
got disgusted with naval intelligence and applied for sea duty. En
route to his new post in the southwest Pacifi c he passed through
Hawaii. Th ere he was guest of honor at a party given by several
offi cers who had served on Kimmel’s staff . McCollum told them
some of the things he had known through his work with intelligence
in Washington. 10
Cracks in the Administration’s Wall of Secrecy
One of the offi cers in Hawaii who heard McCollum speak
was Commander Joseph John Rochefort, chief intelligence offi -
cer, district staff of the commandant in Hawaii. Rochefort spoke
Japanese; his work in radio intelligence, cryptography, and cryptanalysis
had made him one of the mainstays of the intelligence
unit at Pearl Harbor. It had been his responsibility to prepare
daily intelligence summaries for Kimmel’s fl eet intelligence offi -
cer, Lieutenant Commander Edwin Th omas Layton. 11 In spite of
9 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 3388–90, McCollum testimony
before the Joint Committee; part 26, p. 392, Saff ord testimony before
the Hart Inquiry; part 29, p. 2396, Saff ord testimony at APHB. See also
McCollum letter, May 21, 1944, to Kimmel and Kimmel interview, May 18,
1945, of McCollum (typescripts of both papers in author’s fi les).
10 Saff ord, “Victims of the Kita Message,” pp. 49–50. See also Joint Committee,
Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3382. McCollum was reassigned from Washington
to the Southwest Pacifi c Force in October 1942. See Kimmel’s interview
of McCollum.
11 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 10, pp. 4673, 4679–80, Rochefort
testimony before the Joint Committee. Rochefort was awarded the Distinguished
Service Medal posthumously, in 1985, for his success in cracking the
Japanese codes revealing the time, date, and place of Japan’s plan to invade