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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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412 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

sent to London <strong>and</strong> on April 30, 1942, given comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the<br />

recently established (March 17, 1942) United States Naval Forces<br />

Europe. 6<br />

Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff Marshall appeared to be above reproach. In spite<br />

<strong>of</strong> questions about his whereabouts on the morning <strong>of</strong> December<br />

6, he remained in his position <strong>and</strong> went on later to still more<br />

important <strong>and</strong> prestigious positions—special representative <strong>of</strong> the<br />

president to China with ambassadorial rank (1945–1946), secretary<br />

<strong>of</strong> state (1947–1949), <strong>and</strong> secretary <strong>of</strong> defense 7 (1950–1951).<br />

He even received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 for his proposal,<br />

which became known as the Marshall Plan, for U.S. government<br />

grants to help post-war Europe’s economic recovery.<br />

Naval intelligence <strong>and</strong> naval communications were especially<br />

hard hit by personnel changes. Th e Navy’s traditional pride in<br />

service at sea meant that the path to promotion clearly lay in<br />

sea duty; those who served in intelligence were much less likely<br />

to advance. As a result, few naval <strong>of</strong>fi cers were willing to make a<br />

career in cryptography. One notable exception was Comm<strong>and</strong>er<br />

L.F. Saff ord, who had been in charge <strong>of</strong> the security section <strong>of</strong><br />

naval communications <strong>and</strong> had made brilliant contributions to<br />

deciphering <strong>and</strong> interpreting Japanese intercepts. Shortly after<br />

the United States entered the war, he was promoted to captain<br />

( January 1, 1942), but at the same time his duties <strong>and</strong> responsibilities<br />

were sharply curtailed. 8<br />

Comm<strong>and</strong>er A.H. McCollum, head <strong>of</strong> the Far Eastern<br />

Section <strong>of</strong> Naval Intelligence in December 1941, was another<br />

victim <strong>of</strong> the post-attack reorganization <strong>of</strong> naval operations. He<br />

6Ibid, p. 24.<br />

7On September 18, 1947, the Departments <strong>of</strong> War <strong>and</strong> Navy were incorporated<br />

into a new Department <strong>of</strong> Defense.<br />

8Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 8, p. 3556, Saff ord testimony before<br />

the Joint Committee. See also L.F. Saff ord, “Victims <strong>of</strong> the Kita Message,”<br />

April 8, 1968, p. 46, unpublished manuscript (typescript in author’s fi les).

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