Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

1942–1944 411
to sign a paper never to disclose it, practically so long as he lived,
or ever to talk about it”—not ever! 2
Navy intelligence offi cers too were warned to maintain security.
“Sometime within the week following Pearl Harbor,” then
Commander Saff ord and other offi cers were “called into conference
in the offi ce of the Director of Naval Communications
[Admiral Noyes]. . . . [A]ll section heads were asked to tell all
[their] people not to talk.” Any written memoranda, personal
notes—not offi cial fi les—were to be destroyed immediately and
the offi cers were to “pass that word on to [their] subordinates.” 3
But questions about Pearl Harbor did not let up.
Post-Attack Personnel Shakeup
As we have seen, both Admiral Kimmel and General Short
were peremptorily removed from their commands after the
attack on Pearl Harbor. Replacement offi cers were named, then
promptly retired from the military. 4 Some suspicion rested on
Chief of Naval Operations Stark for not having kept Kimmel
and Admiral Hart in the Philippines better informed. On March
26, Admiral E.J. King took over Stark’s position as CNO. 5 Stark
was in eff ect “kicked upstairs,” transferred out of Washington,
279th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 5, p. 2468, Stark testimony before the
Joint Committee.
3Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 3565–66, Saff ord testimony
before the Joint Committee.
4Short’s command was turned over to Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons.
Kimmel was replaced temporarily as Chief of the Pacifi c Fleet by Admiral
William S. Pye and then, once the arrangements for the transfer could be
worked out, by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.
5U.S. Department of Navy, Naval History Division, Offi ce of the Chief of
Naval Operations, United States Naval Chronology, World War II (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Offi ce, 1955), p. 22.