Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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20.
1942–1944
Top Secrecy on the Washington Home Front
Once we had declared war, a wave of patriotism swept over
the country. All open criticism of the government’s foreign
policy ceased. Yet a desire to know the truth simmered
under the surface. Many people believed that Admiral Kimmel
and General Short, who had been pilloried in the eyes of the
public, should have a chance to present their side of the story in
open court, but attempts were being made to forestall their courts
martial.
Th ere were, of course, legitimate reasons why their case should
not be investigated while the war was going on. Information
would undoubtedly be revealed in a courts martial trial that would
be damaging to the war eff ort. It would undoubtedly be brought
out (1) that the Japanese were still using their diplomatic code,
“Purple,” for secret messages. As our armed forces were gaining
information from reading “Purple” intercepts, which was valuable
for fi ghting the war, this was a legitimate argument for postponing
a trial. A trial would probably reveal also (2) that U.S. intelligence
personnel had deciphered “Purple” before the attack on
Pearl Harbor and had been reading Japanese intercepts ever since.