Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
The Administration Initiates an Investigation 405 Attorney General Francis Biddle and Acting Assistant Solicitor General Edward Dickinson were consulted. Several suggestions with respect to the wording were made by FDR and others. FDR was anxious to have the matter settled. Finally, a phrase very similar to that suggested for the War Department’s letter to Short was agreed on. On February 19 Kimmel received formal notifi cation from Knox that he would be placed on the retired list on March 1. Knox’s letter read in part: “Th is approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any off ense or prejudice to future disciplinary action.” 133 Ever since the attack, blame and opprobrium had been heaped on both Kimmel and Short. Th ey had received abusive letters and even threats on their lives. When Kimmel read the second paragraph of Knox’s letter, with its conditional approval of his request for retirement, he promptly wrote Stark: Was the letter “to be published to the country as a promise that I will be disciplined at some future time”? Kimmel stood “ready at any time to accept the consequences of [his] acts.” He did “not wish to embarrass the government in the conduct of the war;” but he felt that his “crucifi xion before the public has about reached the limit.” He felt that publication of the secretary’s letter with its conditional approval of Kimmel’s retirement would “further infl ame the public and do [him] a great injustice.” 134 Kimmel “regret[ted] the losses at Pearl Harbor just as keenly, or perhaps more keenly than any other American citizen.” He wished he had been smarter than he was and able to foresee the events of December 7. He had devoted all 133 Ibid., part 19, p. 3963; part 33, p.692, Kimmel’s statement to Naval Court of Inquiry. And Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), p. 182. 134 Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, pp. 181–82. See also Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2562.
406 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy his energy to his job and had “made the dispositions” he considered called for. He could not “reproach [himself ] for any lack of eff ort.” He had been “willing to accept [all this] for the good of the country out of [his] loyalty to the Nation.” But he did “think that in all justice the department should do nothing further to infl ame the public against” him. He thought he was “entitled to some consideration even though” some may have believed he had “erred grievously.” 135 Kimmel was retired eff ective March 1 after more than 40 years of service in the Navy. 136 On or about that date Kimmel was notifi ed through the public press . . . that the Secretary of the Navy had directed that charges and specifi cations be prepared to bring [him] to trial by General Court Martial at some future time. 137 Kimmel and Short Find Post-Attack Positions Contributing to the War Effort Both men soon found civilian positions in which they could contribute to the war eff ort. Short became head of the traffi c department at the Ford Motor Company plant in Dallas, Texas, which was devoted entirely to making war equipment. 138 Kimmel took a position with a New York fi rm of consulting marine engineers, Frederick R. Harris, Inc., where he helped design the fi rst 135 Ibid. 136Ibid., part 33, pp. 691–92. Kimmel’s statement to the NCI. 137Th e NewYork Times, August 11, 1942, p. 4. 138Ibid., September 4, 1949, p. 49. Short’s obituary.
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<strong>The</strong> Administration Initiates an Investigation 405<br />
Attorney General Francis Biddle <strong>and</strong> Acting Assistant Solicitor<br />
General Edward Dickinson were consulted. Several suggestions<br />
with respect to the wording were made by FDR <strong>and</strong> others. FDR<br />
was anxious to have the matter settled. Finally, a phrase very similar<br />
to that suggested for the War Department’s letter to Short<br />
was agreed on.<br />
On February 19 Kimmel received formal notifi cation from<br />
Knox that he would be placed on the retired list on March 1.<br />
Knox’s letter read in part: “Th is approval <strong>of</strong> your request for retirement<br />
is without condonation <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong>f ense or prejudice to future<br />
disciplinary action.” 133<br />
Ever since the attack, blame <strong>and</strong> opprobrium had been heaped<br />
on both Kimmel <strong>and</strong> Short. Th ey had received abusive letters <strong>and</strong><br />
even threats on their lives.<br />
When Kimmel read the second paragraph <strong>of</strong> Knox’s letter,<br />
with its conditional approval <strong>of</strong> his request for retirement,<br />
he promptly wrote Stark: Was the letter “to be published to the<br />
country as a promise that I will be disciplined at some future<br />
time”? Kimmel stood “ready at any time to accept the consequences<br />
<strong>of</strong> [his] acts.” He did “not wish to embarrass the government<br />
in the conduct <strong>of</strong> the war;” but he felt that his “crucifi xion<br />
before the public has about reached the limit.” He felt that publication<br />
<strong>of</strong> the secretary’s letter with its conditional approval <strong>of</strong><br />
Kimmel’s retirement would “further infl ame the public <strong>and</strong> do<br />
[him] a great injustice.” 134 Kimmel “regret[ted] the losses at <strong>Pearl</strong><br />
<strong>Harbor</strong> just as keenly, or perhaps more keenly than any other<br />
American citizen.” He wished he had been smarter than he was<br />
<strong>and</strong> able to foresee the events <strong>of</strong> December 7. He had devoted all<br />
133 Ibid., part 19, p. 3963; part 33, p.692, Kimmel’s statement to Naval Court <strong>of</strong><br />
Inquiry. And Husb<strong>and</strong> E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Henry<br />
Regnery Co., 1955), p. 182.<br />
134 Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, pp. 181–82. See also Joint Committee,<br />
<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 6, p. 2562.