Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

402 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
and with skeleton crews, resulting in the destruction of four of
these planes.” Th e War Department, which had dispatched these
planes from the mainland during the night of December 6–7,
apparently had not anticipated the attack on Pearl Harbor. Short
considered that “a strong argument” that the War Department
had “agreed with [Short] that sabotage was the most dangerous
thing to the Hawaiian Department.” 120
By the afternoon of Short’s call, Marshall was of “the opinion
that we should accept General Short’s application for retirement
today and to do this quietly without any publicity at the
moment.” Th e Judge Advocate General saw no objection to this
procedure and stated “[q]uite informally” that he considered a
Court of Inquiry “unnecessary . . . and that a court-martial would
not be in the public interest at this time.” 121 When Marshall
received Short’s written application a couple of days later, he forwarded
it to the adjutant general to hold pending instructions
from Stimson. 122
Th e president asked for assurance that accepting Short’s
retirement would not preclude his later court martial and suggested
including a phrase in the letter reading roughly as follows:
“Provided it is agreed by you that this is no bar to be used legally
or otherwise to subsequent court martial proceedings.” 123 Judge
Advocate Major General Myron C. Cramer questioned the
advisability of bringing a retired offi cer to court martial. Cramer
was doubtful that a conviction could be obtained in Short’s case:
“[T]he off enses charged against General Short are off enses of
omission or nonfeasance which require a much stronger showing
120 Ibid., part 7, pp. 3134–35. Short letter to Marshall, January 25, 1942.
121 Ibid., p. 3139.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid., pp. 3140–41. Assistant Chief of Staff Brigadier General J.H.
Hildring’s letter of February 14, 1942, to the Attorney General.