Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

400 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate
action, transmitted to both commanders . . . it was a dereliction
of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer
with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings,
and the appropriate measures of defense required by the
imminence of hostilities. 114
Th e Commission found Kimmel and Short at fault for having
“failed properly to evaluate the seriousness of the situation. Th ese
errors of judgment were the eff ective cause for the success of the
attack.” 115
Th e Roberts Commission’s purpose, as stated in the executive
order setting it up, was to investigate the contributory negligence
of the military only. However, the Commission went beyond its
offi cial authorization. It gratuitously absolved the top Washington
offi cials, civilian and military, of any blame in a way that was not
supported in the Commission’s published record. It stated specifi
cally in its report that the secretaries of state, war, and navy
had all fulfi lled their respective obligations satisfactorily. It also
stated that the top Army and Navy offi cers in Washington, that
is Marshall and Stark, had both fulfi lled their command responsibilities
properly and had issued suitable and timely warnings to
the Hawaiian commanders. 116
On the other hand, the commanders in Hawaii, Short and
Kimmel, were pronounced guilty of “dereliction of duty.” Th ey
had
demonstrated . . . a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities
vested in them and inherent in their positions as commanders
114 Ibid., part 39, p. 21.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid., p. 19.