Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 399
for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult
and cooperate. 112
Th e members of the Commission had heard testimony to the
eff ect that the only sure way to be forewarned of an approaching
air attack was through continual 360-degree long-range reconnaissance.
But they had also learned that the planes and personnel
available in Hawaii were completely inadequate for carrying
out such reconnaissance. Moreover, they had learned that antiaircraft
artillery is ineff ective against low-fl ying planes. Even with
round-the-clock, far-ranging reconnaissance and an all-out alert,
some of the early torpedo planes that made the fi rst strike on
December 7 would undoubtedly have been able to penetrate the
defenses and surprise the defenders. Th ey recognized that, “Th ere
were defi ciencies in personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities
to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods
of time, but,” they held, “these defi ciencies should not have
aff ected the decision of the responsible commanders as to the
state of readiness to be prescribed.” 113
Th e members of the Commission were much interested in
Marshall’s last minute (December 7) message to the fi eld commanders,
sparked by the “One p.m. Message.” Th ey questioned
him about it, but made no criticism of his dilatory tactics in sending
it out. Nor did they comment on his failure to use his scrambler
phone. And they did not criticize Stark’s failure to act when
he fi rst saw the “One p.m. Message” at about 9:30 that Sunday
morning. Th ey knew that Marshall’s last minute warning did not
reach Short and Kimmel until well after the Japanese planes had
departed Hawaii, but they discounted the diff erence its timely
arrival prior to the attack would have made because of the general
lack of preparedness.
112 Ibid., p. 20.
113 Ibid.