Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

398 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
its severity.” 107 Moreover, in spite of the recognized shortage of
reconnaissance planes, the Commission held that “Means were
available for distant reconnaissance which would have aff orded a
measure of security against a surprise attack.” 108
Th e Commission admitted that the Hawaiian commanders
“were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions
and intent,” which would have been vital to the defense of
Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, in the Commission’s view, “Th e lack
of such knowledge rendered more urgent the initiation of a state
of readiness for defense.” 109 According to the Commission report’s
conclusions, the “responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area
[had] prepared plans which, if adapted and used for the existing
emergency would have been adequate.” 110
Th e Commission members had heard testimony to the eff ect
that the Army and Navy offi cials in Hawaii had cooperated
with one another and had enjoyed fairly good working relations.
Yet they charged that the Hawaiian commanders had “failed to
confer . . . and to adapt and use the existing plans to meet the
emergency.” 111 Th e Commission maintained that if the Hawaiian
commanders had “complied with . . . orders issued by the Chief
of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations November 27, 1941,”
the Army’s aircraft warning system and inshore air patrols, and
the Navy’s distant reconnaissance “should have been operating;”
the Army and Navy antiaircraft artillery
should have been manned and supplied with ammunition; and
a high state of readiness of aircraft should have been in eff ect.
None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained
107 Ibid., part 39, pp. 18–19.
108 Ibid., p. 12.
109 Ibid., p. 18.
110 Ibid., p. 19.
111 Ibid., p. 20.