Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 397
What had the members of the Commission learned in their
month of hearings? Th ey had learned that the intelligence available
in Hawaii was meager indeed, and even misleading. All
available clues had pointed to a Japanese strike in southeast Asia,
thousands of miles west of Pearl Harbor. Th e Commission members
had learned that Pearl Harbor was lacking in planes, anti-aircraft
guns, and other material needed for the defense of the base,
due to the demands of other theaters of war. Th ey had discovered
what they had known before they started their investigation, that
the Hawaiian commanders had been surprised by the Japanese air
attack. But they had also discovered that Chief of Staff Marshall
had been just as surprised. Nevertheless, the Commission placed
the responsibility for the extent of Japan’s success in surprising
the fl eet on the two Hawaiian commanders.
Th e Commission appeared to place considerable credence
on the January 24, 1941, letter from Secretary of Navy Knox to
Secretary of War Stimson, written eleven months before the attack,
suggesting that, “If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily
possible, that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack
upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor” by air bombing
attack, air torpedo plane attack, sabotage, submarine attack,
mining, or bombardment by gun fi re. 106 Disregarding later letters,
intelligence, and communications to the commanders in the fi eld
about the movements of the Japanese in the South China Sea,
the Commission implied that this should have suffi ced to alert
the Hawaiian commanders against a surprise attack.
Th e Commission found that the commanders operated under
some disadvantage: “Th e personnel, matériel, and equipment
were insuffi cient to place the forces on a war footing and maintain
them on that footing for an extended period.” Yet the report
continued: “Th ese defi ciencies did not preclude measures which
would have to a great extent frustrated the attack or mitigated
106 Ibid., pp. 1092–95.