Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. International Policy: 1933–1940 19
sights a submarine, a report thereof will be rushed to the Navy
Department for immediate action.” Th is report was to be submitted
in English, permitting anyone capable of monitoring
the Patrol’s English-language transmissions to benefi t from the
sightings. “Th e plane or surface ship,” FDR continued,
will remain in contact for as long as possible. . . . Planes or
Navy or Coast Guard ships may report the sighting of any
submarine or suspicious surface ships in plain English. . . .
[L]oss of contact with surface ships cannot be tolerated.
Signed “FDR.” 29
Most Americans were, of course, very much concerned about
the war going on in Europe. To many it looked like a repeat of
the 1914–1918 World War. Some wanted the United States to
join England and France immediately against Germany. But
the majority were still anxious to stay out of the struggle. FDR,
always sensitive to public opinion, again reassured the people of
our neutrality. At a New York Herald Tribune Forum on October
26, he stated most emphatically:
In and out of Congress we have heard orators and commentators
and others beating their breasts and proclaiming against
sending the boys of American mothers to fi ght on the battlefi
elds of Europe. Th at, I do not hesitate to label as one of the
worst fakes in current history. It is a deliberate setting up of an
imaginary bogeyman. Th e simple truth is that no person in any
responsible place in the national administration in Washington,
or in any State government, or in any city government, or in
any county government, has ever suggested in any shape, manner
or form the remotest possibility of sending the boys of
29 Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, p. 68.