Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 395
“kept in the vicinity of the landing mat or the apron in groups, so
they could be guarded very closely.” 93
As for naval reconnaissance, Marshall had assumed that, as a
result of the November 27 “war warning,” the Navy would have
dispatched over-water patrols to search for enemy ships. 94 He
appeared unaware of the shortage of planes in Hawaii.
When Stark and Turner were questioned again, this time
under oath, they appeared to have a more realistic view of the
Hawaiian supply situation than Marshall. 95 Turner had “assumed
that they had a long-range reconnaissance,” although he “knew
that there were an insuffi cient number of planes there to conduct
a long-range reconnaissance search 360 degrees extending over a
considerable period of time.” 96
At the time of the November 27 “war warning,” when Stark
had ordered Kimmel to undertake “defensive deployment . . . in
accordance with his [war] plan,” he had expected Kimmel to “take
dispositions to avoid surprise, so far as he could with what he had”
(italics added). However, Stark had thought that Kimmel would
have been able to include air patrols. 97 Stark had also expected
Kimmel “to get more planes and personnel, and so on, out to
Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task forces—some
task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders.” And this,
Stark admitted, Kimmel had done. 98
According to Gerow, the November 27 “war warning” had
called for carrying out “reconnaissance and other means of guarding
against a surprise attack.” 99 Short’s failure to do so, Gerow
93Ibid., part 22, p. 36. Short testimony.
94Ibid., part 23, p. 1077.
95Ibid., pp. 1082–92.
96Ibid., pp. 1085–86.
97Ibid., p. 1086.
98Ibid., p. 1087.
99Ibid., p. 1108.