Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

394 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
and Gerow. Th e most signifi cant testimony was that given by
Marshall, this time under oath. 88
Marshall admitted that even with the superior intelligence
available to him, he had been surprised by the attack. “Japanese
movements were going on around” the Philippines, Marshall
recalled. “And if anything happened they were going to get it. . . .
So, in point of priority, if we had turned to the telephone” to send
a warning, he “certainly would have turned to the Philippines
fi rst.” Washington had had evidence also of
gathering strength in the Mandate Islands, air and naval vessels.
. . . [W]e assumed that Guam would be wiped out of the
picture right at the start. Th at they [the Japanese] would carry
the matter right up to Hawaii I didn’t anticipate. 89
Marshall admitted also that he had “fully anticipated a terrifi
c eff ort to cripple everything out there by sabotage.” 90 He had
considered the local Japanese population to be the greatest threat
to Hawaii. On top of that, he admitted his failure to realize that
Short’s “alert for sabotage” called for bunching the planes. 91 Yet
the specifi c purpose of Alert #1, as stated in the Hawaiian
Department’s Standard Operating Procedure, was to defend
the airfi elds and vital installations “against acts of sabotage and
uprisings.” 92 It was for this reason that Short ordered the planes
88Ibid., part 23, pp. 1075–82.
89Ibid., p. 1081.
90Ibid., p. 1081. Marshall testimony.
91Ibid., p. 1079.
92Ibid., part 24, pp. 1771–76. Short’s “Standing Operation Procedure, Headquarters
Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941.” Th e steps to be taken
under Alerts #1, 2, and 3 are itemized: the phrase “against acts of sabotage
and uprisings” appear on page 1771 in SECTION II-ALERTS, paragraph
14, ALERT NO. 1.