Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 393
warning of the absence of aircraft carriers and battleships was a
bonfi re to be shown on the Island of Mauri [sic] near the Kula
Sanatarium. 84
Had Kimmel known on December 3, when the Japanese consul
sent this message to Tokyo, that a series of signals was being
set up to indicate which ships were in the harbor and which were
out, he would have “immediately reported it to Washington and
[would have] considered it almost equivalent to a declaration of
war.” 85 If he had had this information on December 6, he “would
have ordered all units to sea, because the best dispositions against
surprise air attack can be eff ected with the fl eet at sea.” 86 But he
and Short knew nothing of any such messages. Th ey undoubtedly
had suspected that Japanese spies on Oahu had been watching
the ships in the harbor, although they certainly didn’t know that
messages about ship locations had been decoded, translated, and
read by many top U.S. offi cials, days, even weeks, before the attack.
Likewise, the Roberts commissioners probably did not know that
some of these messages had been available in Washington prior
to the attack—at least none of the Washington offi cials they
questioned had mentioned them.
Back in Washington:
Some Admissions by Marshall
Th e Commission completed its Hawaiian hearings and
departed on January 10, 1942. On January 15 the members arrived
back in Washington and resumed questioning Washington offi -
cials for one day. 87 Th ey again questioned Marshall, Stark, Turner,
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., p. 1050. Kimmel testimony.
86 Ibid., p. 1153. Kimmel. testimony.
87 Ibid., pp. 1075ff .