Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

392 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
war, as Kimmel had noted. Repeated requests by the Hawaiian
commanders for more men and materiel had been ignored.
Post-Attack Revelations in Hawaii
Immediately after the attack, offi cials of the F.B.I. entered the
Japanese consulate in Honolulu. Th ey interrupted the burning of
papers, arrested the consul, and seized Japanese codes and papers.
Short said, “Th ey got almost a complete fi le.” 81 With the help of
these codes, the Navy was soon able to decipher communications
which had passed between Tokyo and the Japanese consul in
the weeks preceding the attack. Th ese captured communications
undoubtedly included the “ships in harbor” messages that had
been intercepted in Hawaii before the attack, forwarded still in
code by airmail on Washington’s orders, then decoded, translated,
and made available before December 7 to Washington offi cials,
—though not to the Hawaiian commanders.
On December 9, Kimmel saw translations of these messages.
Th ey made it very clear that Tokyo had attached special importance
to information concerning the location of ships in Pearl
Harbor. Apparently, “Japan had no intention of attacking Pearl
Harbor in the absence of a large number of our battleships and
aircraft carriers.” 82 One message, sent to Tokyo by the Japanese
consul on December 3 83 itemized
Elaborate arrangements . . . to report to Japanese submarines
and Japanese vessels at sea the departure of aircraft carriers and
battleships from Pearl Harbor by: (1) Broadcast advertisements
over KGMB at 0945 daily; (2) A system of lights from a house
on Lanakai and Kalama during the night and visual day signals
at Lanakai from a star-boat during daylight; (3) Further visual
81 Ibid., part 22, p. 89. Short testimony.
82 Ibid., part 23, p. 1153. Kimmel testimony.
83 Ibid.