Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 391
two weeks’ operations, and they are having an overhaul for new
operations. 77
In addition to the traffi c buildup, Hawaiian Intelligence had
another hint of impending Japanese action—the fl eet’s frequent
code changes in late 1941. Th e Japanese normally changed their
sea and shore calls twice a year, on the fi rst of November and
the fi rst of March or April. But in 1941 they didn’t wait for
November. Th ey changed their codes a month early, on October
1. Th en they changed them again on November 1, and still again
on December 1. 78 Th e Japanese were apparently planning something.
But what? Where? When? Th e Army’s Hawaiian department
relied on information supplied by the Fourteenth Naval
District, the War Department’s G-2 in Washington, which got
its information through ONI. 79
Members of the Roberts Commission asked again and again
why the Hawaiian forces were surprised so completely. Th e intelligence
that reached Hawaii from Washington in the weeks and
months preceding December 7, 1941, warned repeatedly that a
strike was expected in southeast Asia, thousands of miles from
Pearl Harbor. Kimmel summarized: “And the Department by
their dispatches evidenced considerable concern about the security
of their outlying bases.” Even Commission chairman Roberts
admitted that “anyone who reads those telegrams will see that
the Naval Intelligence indicated aggressive movements many
thousand miles from Pearl Harbor.” 80 Th e buildup of Hawaii’s
defenses had been neglected at the expense of other theaters of
77 Ibid., part 23, p. 679. Rochefort testimony. See also part 22, p. 664. Layton
testimony. And Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, And I Was
Th ere: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (New York: W. Morrow,
1985), pp. 228–30.
78 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 23, p. 679. Rochefort testimony.
79 Ibid., part 23, p. 1238.
80 Ibid., p. 1238. Chairman Roberts.