Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 389
they “were alive to the possibility of war.” 72 “[I]n accordance with
the security measures we had in eff ect,” he pointed out, Patrol
Wing 2 did not have to wait for specifi c instructions; it set out
immediately after the attack began to search for the enemy. 73
Hawaii Sworn Testimony: Intelligence
Th e members of the Roberts Commission learned from witness
after witness about the intelligence available to the Hawaiian
commanders. It came principally from four sources: (1) observation,
(2) deciphering of some minor Japanese codes, “PA-K2,”
(3) direction-fi nding (D.F.) stations that analyzed radio beams
broadcast from Japanese ships, and (4) advice forwarded from the
ONI and chief of naval operations (CNO) in Washington.
Responsibility for intelligence in Hawaii was divided between
two authorities: the Combat Intelligence Unit, concerned primarily
with “the functions of the enemy . . . and . . . enemy movements,”
and the District Intelligence Offi cer, who “has more to do
with defense. . . . Subversive activities, aliens, sabotage, and that
sort of thing.” 74 Commander Joseph John Rochefort of Combat
Intelligence tried “to cover every possible transmission . . . by the
Germans, Italians, Japanese” through his D.F. stations and his
interceptor watch, which “intercepts enemy transmissions in the
form of radio messages and copies the radio messages intact.”
His operators were able to pick up transmissions from Tokyo and
the Japanese fl eet. Th en there was also the “search watch,” which
searched “from the bottom of the [radio] band to the top.” 75 To
discover what the Japanese fl eet was doing, the intelligence offi -
cers in Hawaii did their best to piece together what they could
learn from the intercepted radio transmissions, radio beams, and
72Ibid., p. 1167.
73Ibid., p. 1129.
74Ibid., part 22, pp. 673, 676–77. Rochefort testimony.
75Ibid., pp. 677–78.