Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

386 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
in Halsey’s convoy were “to assume a condition of readiness for
instant combat” and to maintain “strict radio silence.” 58
On December 5 Kimmel sent out a second convoy under
Admiral J.H. Newton, with a squadron of planes bound for
Midway. 59
Bloch, who had taken over the responsibility for the security
of the base, had written the Navy Department about “the
weakness in the pursuit planes, bombing planes, and anti-aircraft
guns.” Th e Army had dispatched to Hawaii a large number of
pursuit planes and some heavy bombers, but “no anti-aircraft guns
[were] forthcoming.” 60 When Bloch pressed his need for planes
and vessels, he was told they were “doing everything within their
power to get them” and would send them as soon as they could. 61
As a result of Bloch’s eff orts, Pearl Harbor fi nally obtained “one
division of destroyers, four destroyers, only one of which has any
listening gear, and one division of four mine sweepers.” In accordance
with Kimmel’s order, the destroyers were stationed at the
harbor entrance; the mine sweepers swept the channel; the nets
were operating; and boom and harbor patrols were executed.
However, “anti-aircraft protection of Pearl Harbor was weak.”
Bloch was also charged “on paper” with the responsibility for distant
reconnaissance; 108 patrol planes had been promised for that
purpose, “none of which had ever arrived; not one of them.” 62
Before December 7 Short received three serious warning
messages from Washington—October 16, November 27, and
November 28. 63 All three messages
58Ibid., part 23, p. 608. Halsey testimony.
59Ibid., p. 1166. Kimmel.
60Ibid., part 22, p. 471. Bloch testimony.
61Ibid., pp. 461, 469. Bloch testimony.
62Ibid., p. 469. Bloch testimony.
63Ibid., p. 39. Short testimony.