Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 385
getting their planes in a ferrying condition here. . . . Th ey had their
problems too,” Kimmel said. 54 Short and Kimmel met with staff
members on November 27 to discuss the transfer from Oahu of
25 pursuit planes each to Wake and Midway, as Washington had
ordered. 55 Kimmel questioned his war plans offi cer: “[W]hat is
your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu?” McMorris:
“I should say none, Admiral.” At the time, Short said,
[T]here was no exception taken to that statement by either
Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch, and apparently the Navy
felt that they had defi nite information of the location of carriers
and major ships of the Japanese and that there was no question
in their minds of the possibility or probability of a surprise
attack upon Oahu. 56
Th e construction of the airfi elds on Wake and Midway had to
be carried out “under the most adverse conditions. We were faced
with the necessity of building bases and of protecting them at
the same time.” Th e dispatch of reinforcements there would seriously
weaken Hawaii’s defensive forces. It was fi nally decided to
send only half the number of planes Washington had suggested.
“Rightly or wrongly, “ Kimmel testifi ed, “we eventually had there
about 350 marines and 6 5-inch guns and 12 3-inch guns and a
number of machine guns, and we had 12 fi ghting planes there.” 57
On November 28 Kimmel dispatched a convoy, under Admiral
William F. Halsey, with men and planes to Wake. Because “there
had been a warning from the Chief of Naval Operations that
the conversations with the Japanese representatives were about
to break down, and to be prepared for eventualities,” all the ships
54 Ibid., part 23, p. 1151.
55 Ibid., part 22, p. 43.
56 Ibid., part 22, p. 43. Short testimony.
57 Ibid., part 23, p. 1190. Kimmel testimony.