Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

384 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
and also (3) keep them scattered about, warmed up 24 hours a
day, and ready to take to the air. He didn’t have enough planes to
accomplish both (1) and (2), and he hadn’t considered the threat
serious enough to justify (3). 49
On October 17 Stark had wired Kimmel:
Because of the great importance of continuing to reenforce the
Philippines with long range Army bombers you are requested
to take all practical precautions for the safety of the airfi elds at
Wake and Midway. 50
Th e plan was to ferry some 60 long-range bombers out to
the Philippines via Hawaii and Wake. As Kimmel was “responsible
for the defense of Wake and for the defense of Midway and
for putting Marines and guns and all other defensive weapons
out there,” 51 he proceeded to strengthen their defenses as best he
could.
Th e “war warning” message of November 27 had instructed
Kimmel to carry out “the tasks assigned in WPL 46,” that is, to get
ready to attack the Japanese bases in the Marshall Island. 52 Two
other dispatches on that same day ordered him to prepare troops
for our advance bases and to transport 25 Army pursuit planes
with ground crews to Wake and Midway. “Stationing these planes
[on Wake and Midway] must not be allowed to interfere with
planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines.” 53 Kimmel
realized the Army was short of planes. Shortly before reinforcing
Wake and Midway he had wanted the Army to participate in
Navy maneuvers, but the Army “could not do it because they
were engaged in ferrying these planes to the Asiatics, and in
49Ibid., part 22, p. 76. Short testimony.
50Ibid., part 14, p. 1403. From CNO to CINCPAC, #171458.
51Ibid., part 23, p. 1240. Kimmel testimony.
52Ibid., part 6, p. 2518.
53 Ibid.