Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 383
ships in such a restricted area against a serious attack, no matter
how much you tried.” With so many ships docked so close
together, he could not have guaranteed that no enemy plane could
get in and make a hit; some “would be bound to suff er losses.” 46
Th roughout 1941, the Hawaiian commanders—Kimmel,
Short, and Bloch—had pressed repeatedly for additional men
and equipment. Th ey received some reinforcements but these
failed to build up the Hawaiian forces as hoped, as other factors
were steadily eroding them. Regular and experienced offi -
cers were being “detached at an alarming rate,” and many trained
enlisted men were not planning to reenlist when their duty was
up. 47 In May 1941, about a quarter of the Pacifi c Fleet’s ships
had been transferred to the Atlantic on orders from Washington.
Moreover, relatively few of the new planes, men, and guns that
reached Hawaii remained there; most continued on to the west.
Th e Army was “engaged in ferrying . . . planes to the Asiatics.” 48
Long-range patrol bombers were being fl own to the Philippines
via Hawaii, Midway, Wake, and Australia.
Over and above the Army’s defensive role at Pearl Harbor,
the Army air corps “had a very specifi c mission . . . of preparing
. . . combat teams to ferry planes [B-17s] to the Philippines.” No
one can just step into the cockpit of a B-17, a Flying Fortress,
from his training ship and immediately fl y it across the Pacifi c.
A pilot must fi rst train on B-18s and A-20s, and then serve as a
B-17 copilot, before taking over as a full-fl edged B-17 pilot. It
would have been risky to send a plane across the Pacifi c with a
half-trained crew, and Short had only six bombers at his disposal
to do all this training. Short couldn’t (1) use these six bombers
for training pilots for ferrying missions, and at the same time
(2) turn them over to the Navy for long-range reconnaissance,
46Ibid., part 22, p. 104. Short testimony.
47Ibid., part 23, p. 1155. Kimmel memo to CNO, May 26, 1941.
48Ibid., p. 1151. Kimmel testimony.