Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

382 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
reported by the patrol, and they have been isolated instances.” 42
Nor was Kimmel “conscious . . . of the special dangers of a
Sunday,” 43 when more passes and leaves were issued on Saturdays
and fewer men and offi cers were apt to be aboard ship, alert, and
ready for action. Th ere were not “appreciably more” absences of
offi cers and men on Sunday than on any other day. True, some
commanding offi cers were ashore, but that depended on whether
or not their families were in Hawaii. Th ere were “a great many
offi cers here who had no families, and they slept on board,” so
if there were fewer offi cers aboard it was “not entirely” due to its
being a weekend. 44
Hawaii Sworn Testimony: Preparedness
As Admiral Richardson prepared to relinquish command of
the U.S. Pacifi c Fleet in January 1941, he and Kimmel, who was
preparing to take over command, collaborated in a letter to Chief
of Naval Operations Stark, concerning the security measures
required “for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.”
“Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel,”
they wrote, were “possible.” Th e fl eet was “severely handicapped”
in preparing for such contingencies by “certain marked
defi ciencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment
both Army and Navy.” Moreover, many of the fl eet’s facilities
were obsolescent. Richardson and Kimmel urged that correcting
these “critical defi ciencies” be given “priority over the needs of
continental districts, the training program, and material aid to
Great Britain.” 45
Short, who was responsible for the protection of the fl eet when
in Pearl Harbor, said it was “practically impossible to protect the
42Ibid., part 23, p. 1236.
43Ibid., p. 1184.
44Ibid., p. 1185. Kimmel testimony.
45Ibid., part 22, pp. 329–31.