Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 381
Th e Navy under Kimmel had been diligent in conducting
reconnaissance, mainly anti-submarine patrols, covering the 25
to 50 mile belt around the island that the available planes could
cover. 36 However, Kimmel admitted that he had considered an
air attack “highly improbable” and patrols to the northward
not justifi ed. Had he had warning that an air attack was anywhere
near probable, he said, “I would have used everything we
had, everything.” 37 But given the state of the planes, it seemed
more prudent to conserve them for action in the war that was
anticipated.
In addition to considering the likelihood of submarine and
air attacks, the Navy had also considered the possibility of a torpedo
attack. However, this threat had generally been discounted
because of the shallowness of the approach to Pearl Harbor. 38 So
“the use of [anti-torpedo] baffl es for Pearl Harbor or other harbors
in the Fourteenth Naval District” was not recommended. 39 In
June, the Navy Department again concluded that a torpedo plane
attack in Pearl Harbor’s relatively shallow water was unlikely. In
any event, no anti-torpedo baffl es were installed.
Th ere had been “gossip in the newspapers in the States” to
the eff ect that there had been “a lot of drinking and that some
in the high command were not fi t for duty” on Sunday morning,
December 7. 40 Both Kimmel and his aide, Admiral Th eobald,
denied that drunkenness was a contributing factor; “no liquor is
allowed on board ship.” 41 According to Kimmel, there had been
“very little drunkenness among the offi cers and men of this fl eet.
We have dealt very seriously with the incidents which were
36Ibid., p. 462. Bloch testimony.
37Ibid., part 23, p. 1183. Kimmel testimony.
38Ibid., p. 1137.
39Ibid., p. 1139.
40Ibid., p. 1236.
41Ibid., p. 1235.