Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
The Administration Initiates an Investigation 379 Bloch, who had once held Kimmel’s position as commanderin-chief of the fl eet, said that the possibility of a Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor had always been “a consideration, but in all estimates of the situation that [he was] familiar with . . . it was considered remote.” 28 Nevertheless, in March Major General F. L. Martin, commander of the Army’s Hawaiian Air Force, and Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, commander of the Navy’s Naval Base Defense Air Force, had examined the prospects of an attack on the fl eet in Hawaii: 29 [T]he most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack . . . launched from one or more carriers. . . . In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might fi nd us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start. Th e two commanders recommended “daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise.” However, they realized that this can only be eff ectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits. 30 “Distant reconnaissance,” a Navy responsibility, was generally acknowledged to be the best assurance against an approaching surprise attack. However, Bloch reported that reconnaissance planes were in serious short supply on the islands. It was estimated 28 Ibid., part 22, pp. 460–61, Bloch testimony. 29 Ibid., part 23, pp. 1144–48. Martin-Bellinger memo, March 31, 1941. 30 Ibid., p. 1145 (emphasis added).
380 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy that to patrol 360 degrees continually would have required 200- 300 planes. 31 “On paper,” Bloch testifi ed, [he] had been given 108 patrol planes for that specifi c purpose [distant reconnaissance], none of which had ever arrived; not one of them. 32 . . . We had a plane-building program, and on that plane-building program the assignment of the 14th Naval District was nine squadrons of patrol planes and two squadrons of observation planes, and they were the District forces that were supposed to do this reconnaissance, but there were none of them ever delivered here because they hadn’t been built. 33 Twenty-four of Oahu’s 72 patrol bombers were then out with the task forces Kimmel had sent to reinforce the bases on Wake and Midway. Only 36 planes were still at Oahu, 12 of which were under overhaul. Th ere were nowhere nearly enough planes in Hawaii to carry out any distant reconnaissance. 34 Bloch related his experience in 1938, when he had been commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet. “Th ey endeavored to make the 360-degree search with the planes they had, and we had a tremendous number of casualties.” In a few days they “lost something like four or fi ve planes, and two of them lost all the crews.” Th ey lost the other planes that went down, but recovered the personnel. Th e lesson from this maneuver was that to conduct a search effi ciently and to maintain it required a large number of planes, and they had to be operated more or less day on and day off , so that one day they [the crews] would go out; the next day they could rest. In other words the strain on the personnel was greater than it was on the matériel. 35 31Ibid., part 23, pp. 1134, 1183. Kimmel testimony. 32Ibid., part 22, p. 460. Bloch testimony. 33Ibid., pp. 469–70. Bloch testimony. 34Ibid., p. 487. Kimmel testimony. 35Ibid., p. 466. Bloch testimony.
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380 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />
that to patrol 360 degrees continually would have required 200-<br />
300 planes. 31 “On paper,” Bloch testifi ed,<br />
[he] had been given 108 patrol planes for that specifi c purpose<br />
[distant reconnaissance], none <strong>of</strong> which had ever arrived; not<br />
one <strong>of</strong> them. 32 . . . We had a plane-building program, <strong>and</strong> on<br />
that plane-building program the assignment <strong>of</strong> the 14th Naval<br />
District was nine squadrons <strong>of</strong> patrol planes <strong>and</strong> two squadrons<br />
<strong>of</strong> observation planes, <strong>and</strong> they were the District forces that<br />
were supposed to do this reconnaissance, but there were none<br />
<strong>of</strong> them ever delivered here because they hadn’t been built. 33<br />
Twenty-four <strong>of</strong> Oahu’s 72 patrol bombers were then out with<br />
the task forces Kimmel had sent to reinforce the bases on Wake<br />
<strong>and</strong> Midway. Only 36 planes were still at Oahu, 12 <strong>of</strong> which were<br />
under overhaul. Th ere were nowhere nearly enough planes in<br />
Hawaii to carry out any distant reconnaissance. 34 Bloch related<br />
his experience in 1938, when he had been comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-chief <strong>of</strong><br />
the U.S. Fleet. “Th ey endeavored to make the 360-degree search<br />
with the planes they had, <strong>and</strong> we had a tremendous number <strong>of</strong><br />
casualties.” In a few days they “lost something like four or fi ve<br />
planes, <strong>and</strong> two <strong>of</strong> them lost all the crews.” Th ey lost the other<br />
planes that went down, but recovered the personnel. Th e lesson<br />
from this maneuver was that<br />
to conduct a search effi ciently <strong>and</strong> to maintain it required a<br />
large number <strong>of</strong> planes, <strong>and</strong> they had to be operated more or<br />
less day on <strong>and</strong> day <strong>of</strong>f , so that one day they [the crews] would<br />
go out; the next day they could rest. In other words the strain<br />
on the personnel was greater than it was on the matériel. 35<br />
31Ibid., part 23, pp. 1134, 1183. Kimmel testimony.<br />
32Ibid., part 22, p. 460. Bloch testimony.<br />
33Ibid., pp. 469–70. Bloch testimony.<br />
34Ibid., p. 487. Kimmel testimony.<br />
35Ibid., p. 466. Bloch testimony.