Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 379
Bloch, who had once held Kimmel’s position as commanderin-chief
of the fl eet, said that the possibility of a Japanese air
raid on Pearl Harbor had always been “a consideration, but in all
estimates of the situation that [he was] familiar with . . . it was
considered remote.” 28 Nevertheless, in March Major General F.
L. Martin, commander of the Army’s Hawaiian Air Force, and
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, commander of the Navy’s Naval
Base Defense Air Force, had examined the prospects of an attack
on the fl eet in Hawaii: 29
[T]he most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu
would be an air attack . . . launched from one or more carriers.
. . . In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it
could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols
we might be using and that it might fi nd us in a condition of
readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start.
Th e two commanders recommended “daily patrols as far as
possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities
of surface or air surprise.” However, they realized that this
can only be eff ectively maintained with present personnel and
material for a very short period and as a practicable measure
cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates
that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time
limits. 30
“Distant reconnaissance,” a Navy responsibility, was generally
acknowledged to be the best assurance against an approaching
surprise attack. However, Bloch reported that reconnaissance
planes were in serious short supply on the islands. It was estimated
28 Ibid., part 22, pp. 460–61, Bloch testimony.
29 Ibid., part 23, pp. 1144–48. Martin-Bellinger memo, March 31, 1941.
30 Ibid., p. 1145 (emphasis added).