Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

378 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
were fl own off their mother ships. Th us, the Navy “require[d]
shore air bases for the use of carrier aircraft in order to maintain
them in a proper state of training for war readiness” 22 and so that
“in event of being caught in port those planes could be useful.”
Th ose shore air bases, also needed to outfi t the carrier planes with
bombs and ammunition, were an Army responsibility. When the
planes assigned to carriers or to the Marines were “shore based,”
they came under the commander Fleet Air Detachment. 23 Air
combat, Army pursuit airplanes, antiaircraft artillery, and the
Aircraft Warning Service (radar) were under the command of
the Army’s interceptor commander. 24 Radar, still in its infancy in
1941, was not fully operational on the morning of December 7; it
was then “operating for drill purposes only.” 25
Hawaii Sworn Testimony: The Surprise Element
Knox, recalling eleven-month old correspondence between
him and Stimson, considered an air bombing attack or an air torpedo
plane attack the greatest potential dangers and urged Stimson
to have the Army improve Pearl Harbor’s readiness to meet such
attacks. 26 Stimson assured Knox that the Hawaiian Department
“is the best equipped of all our overseas departments,” and he was
working to further improve its defensive capabilities: new pursuit
planes had been promised; Aircraft Warning Service equipment
and barrage balloons were on order. 27
22Ibid., part 23, p. 1218; part 24, p. 1564. From Report of Army-Navy Board,
October 31, 1941.
23Ibid., part 23, pp. 554–55. Bellinger testimony.
24Ibid., part 22, p. 40. Short testimony.
25Ibid., part 23, p.1209.
26Ibid., 1092–94. Correspondence of January 24, 1941.
27Stimson memorandum, February 7, 1941. Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor
Attack, part 23, pp. 1094–95.