01.01.2013 Views

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

<strong>The</strong> Administration Initiates an Investigation 377<br />

had enjoyed “closer cooperation in the last eight or ten months<br />

than . . . ever . . . before.” 15<br />

Testimony revealed clearly that responsibility for the protection<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>’s shore-based establishments rested on the<br />

Army <strong>and</strong> Navy jointly. 16 Th e Army’s role was basically to defend<br />

onshore establishments, the naval base, <strong>and</strong> the fl eet when it was<br />

in harbor. Th e Navy’s responsibility was <strong>of</strong>f ensive, to support the<br />

Army by operations at sea. Th e Navy was not responsible for the<br />

defense <strong>of</strong> the base in case <strong>of</strong> an air raid, but, it was “responsible for<br />

the naval elements that could be made available [to the Army <strong>and</strong><br />

the Army Air Force] for the defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>.” 17 Kimmel<br />

was not included in the joint Army-Navy plan for defending the<br />

base’s onshore establishments; he fully “expected when the fi ght<br />

came on that he wouldn’t be down here in the harbor; that he<br />

would be on the high seas fi ghting.” 18 According to him, the fl eet<br />

was to have freedom <strong>of</strong> action, to “go <strong>and</strong> come without being<br />

concerned about the safety . . . [except for] the broader strategy<br />

<strong>of</strong> operations.” 19 As Kimmel put it, “a Fleet base is a haven for<br />

refi t, supply, <strong>and</strong> for rest <strong>and</strong> recreation <strong>of</strong> personnel after arduous<br />

duties <strong>and</strong> strenuous operations at sea.” 20 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>’s defense<br />

was in the h<strong>and</strong>s <strong>of</strong> the Army.<br />

Th e Navy’s aircraft carriers were <strong>of</strong> special concern. Planes<br />

could not take <strong>of</strong>f from a docked carrier, so when in port, both<br />

carrier <strong>and</strong> any planes “would be vulnerable . . . to attack <strong>and</strong> . . .<br />

destruction.” 21 For safety’s sake, when in harbor, carrier aircraft<br />

15Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 22, p.55.<br />

16Ibid., part 22, p. 11, testimony <strong>of</strong> Major William S. Lawton, general staff<br />

corps liaison <strong>of</strong>fi cer with the Navy, in charge <strong>of</strong> joint Army-Navy activities.<br />

17Ibid., part 23, p. 1149. Kimmel testimony; part 22, pp. 10–11. Kimmel memor<strong>and</strong>um<br />

<strong>of</strong> December 21, 1941; part 23, 1211 Kimmel testimony.<br />

18Ibid., part 22, p. 55. Short testimony.<br />

19Ibid., part 23, pp. 1129–34.<br />

20Ibid., part 23, p. 1129.<br />

21Ibid., part 23, pp. 1217–18.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!