Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

376 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Japanese eff ort would be initiated.” Hawaii was “not specifi cally
mentioned as a point of attack.” 11
Th e director of Naval Intelligence Division acknowledged that
“secret information” had been received in Washington leading the
Navy to conclude in November “that the Japanese were contemplating
an early attack.” According to him, “[c]are was taken . . . to
see that these two offi cers [Kimmel in Hawaii and Admiral Hart
in the Philippines] were kept fully advised as to developments.” 12
So he assumed that they had been sent this information.
Pearl Harbor Testimony Under Oath
On completion of the Washington testimony, the members
of the Commission fl ew to Pearl Harbor. By then, Congress had
approved a joint resolution granting the Commission power to
conduct a proper investigation and authorizing it to “administer
oaths and affi rmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence.” 13
Th us, the military offi cers in Hawaii testifi ed under oath. Both
Short and Kimmel were still in the service, although they had
been relieved of their respective commands on December 16,
shortly after the attack. Short’s staff was available to help him;
Kimmel’s staff had put to sea with the fl eet, so he had little help
in preparing his testimony. 14
Hawaii Sworn Testimony: Responsibility
According to the plan then in eff ect, Army and Navy coordinated
their operations for the defense of Pearl Harbor. Th e three
principals—Kimmel, Bloch, and Short—had been “very frank
with each other,” “talked things over,” and Short believed they
11Ibid., part 23, p. 1357. Brief of Admiral Stark’s Testimony.
12Ibid., part 23, p. 1361. Statement by Captain T. S. Wilkinson.
13Ibid., part 24, pp. 1307–08.
14Standley and Agerton, Admiral Ambassador, pp. 83–84.