Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Administration Initiates an Investigation 375
of the offi cers was sworn. Nor were they cross-examined. No transcripts,
only brief summaries, of their remarks were published. 7
Secretary of State Hull had agreed to advise the Commission
by letter as to warnings of probable Japanese attack he had
received from Stimson and Knox. 8 Th e secretaries of war and
navy, interviewed jointly by the Commission members, off ered
“the fullest cooperation of their Departments.” General Marshall
and Admiral Stark
appeared together . . . and furnished information . . . showing
that [Kimmel and Short] . . . had been specifi cally warned of
the likelihood of a probable outbreak of war . . . on October 16,
November 24, and November 27, 1941. 9
General Marshall related “informative or warning messages
sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department,”
including his December 7 message to General Short which had
been dispatched “on the morning of December 7” but which had
not reached Short in Hawaii until after the attack. 10
Th e tenor of this unsworn testimony was that Washington
had been fully alert to the possibility of a surprise Japanese attack
and of “sudden raids” on Pearl Harbor. Stark was obliged to admit,
however, that all the warnings sent out from Washington to the
fl eet commanders in the months before the attack concerning
the possibility of “attacks and expeditions against positions in the
Far East” conveyed the idea that both he and Marshall believed
“the Far East would be the locality where the major sustained
7Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 24, pp. 1355–61. “Precis of Testimony.”
8Ibid., part 23, p. 1245.
9Ibid., p. 1246.
10Ibid., pp. 1, 2. See also ibid., part 14, pp. 1409–10 (Exhibit No. 39), memoranda
prepared for the record by L.T. Gerow and W.B. Smith regarding
Marshall’s December 7, 1941 warning.