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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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374 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

were found, it was to determine “who were responsible therefor.” 3<br />

Th e Commission’s authority was limited to investigating Army <strong>and</strong><br />

Navy personnel only; no civilian personnel.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Commission Begins Hearings<br />

Th e Commission convened in Washington December 17, with<br />

only four <strong>of</strong> its fi ve members present. When Admiral St<strong>and</strong>ley<br />

arrived the next day, he found the Commission to be a “mixed”—<br />

<strong>and</strong> a very mixed up—Presidential commission “with civilian,<br />

naval <strong>and</strong> military members, for which there was no precedent in<br />

law, custom or jurisprudence.” He was “shocked at the irregularity<br />

<strong>of</strong> the procedure <strong>of</strong> the Commission <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the reliance placed<br />

upon unsworn testimony.” 4 It was “empowered to prescribe its<br />

own procedure” but as originally set up, “it did not have the legal<br />

power to do anything which would be usual <strong>and</strong> essential to carry<br />

out the purposes for which it had been formed” 5 —to summon<br />

witnesses, enforce their attendance, administer oaths, or take testimony.<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ley protested at this lack <strong>of</strong> formal authority. 6<br />

Washington Testimony—Unsworn<br />

Th e Commission members knew nothing <strong>of</strong> pre-attack events<br />

except what they had read in the newspapers. Th ey began by questioning<br />

top military <strong>of</strong>fi cials on the Washington situation. None<br />

3 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack. <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:<br />

U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 5, p. 2210; part 23, p. 1247; part<br />

24, p. 1306.<br />

4 William H. St<strong>and</strong>ley <strong>and</strong> Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia<br />

(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955), pp. 81–82. See also St<strong>and</strong>ley interview in<br />

US. News & World Report, April 16, 1954, pp. 40–46.<br />

5 St<strong>and</strong>ley, Barnes June 1, 1962 interview, p. 8.<br />

6 St<strong>and</strong>ley, U.S. News & World Report, April 16, 1954.

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