Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

372 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
follow-up “service message” trying to track down when that message
to Pearl Harbor had been delivered and to whom. It had
gone to San Francisco by Western Union, which had “a tube running
across the street to the R.C.A.” From there it had gone via
RCA’s powerful transmitter to Hawaii. According to French, that
was “the quickest means” at his disposal at the time. French told
Western Union that he wanted “to know whose hands that message
got into.” Th is inquiry “went on late until the night, and 2:00
in the morning we hadn’t as yet received the reply.” French also
“talked to the signal offi cer over there [in Hawaii] . . . on the wire
and told him it was imperative that [French] inform General
Marshall as to who received that message.” 26
To track Marshall’s message, Washington wired offi cials in
Hawaii on December 9 asking them to
advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number fi ve two
nine [Marshall’s message]. . . . December seven at Honolulu
exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to
staff and by what staff offi cer received.
Hawaii’s reply on December 9, signed by General Short,
stated that the message was delivered to Honolulu, downtown,
via RCA at 7:33 a.m. of the 7th, received, still in code, at the
Signal Offi ce, Fort Shafter, at about 11:45 a.m. It had then still to
be deciphered, and it didn’t reach the adjutant general until 2:58
p.m. in the afternoon. 27
Many other principals concerned with the nation’s defenses
may also have had doubts and questions concerning the responsibility
for the disaster. Some of them undoubtedly looked on the
prospects of a formal investigation with mixed emotions.
26 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 23, p. 1104, French testimony.
27 Ibid., part 24, p. 1828.