Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
The Cover-up Begins 369 accomplishments over the years had earned them respect and advancement to positions in the military hierarchy. Kimmel and Short had been given no indication that their actions had not been completely honest and honorable. Yet at the very moment when trained and experienced men were in greatest demand they were abruptly relieved of their commands—without any charges having been made, without a hearing, without having had a chance to face their accusers, and without an opportunity to defend themselves. Pressure for an Investigation Senator Tom Connally of Texas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a thorough investigation of the leadership at Hawaii. He said, the statement of the Secretary of the Navy that neither the Army nor the Navy were on the alert at Hawaii . . . is astounding. It is almost unbelievable. . . . Th e naval commander and Army general should be vigorously investigated. Th eirs is a responsibility and it ought to be determined whether either or both are ineffi cient or criminally negligent. Th ey must be one or the other. I have always been a big Navy man. . . . I am pained and grieved at its seeming failure of its high duty. 22 At his press conference following his own investigation, Knox had avoided potentially damaging statements. Still questions would undoubtedly be asked as to why the military forces at Pearl Harbor had not been better provided with planes and antiaircraft artillery. Why had they not been more adequately supplied with intelligence? And why had the Navy been based in such a vulnerable position far from our shores? It was becoming obvious that if 22 Th e New York Times, December 16, 1941, p. 7.
370 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the administration was to retain its good name, an offi cial investigation would have to be arranged to answer such questions. Less than 24 hours before the Japanese attack, the Navy Department had announced that the U.S. fl eet was second to none. Yet now many of its ships had been sunk or set ablaze and were resting in the mud at the bottom of Pearl Harbor. More than 2,500 offi cers and enlisted men were dead and 650 more were wounded. 23 Why had seasoned Army and Navy offi cers, who had spent lifetimes preparing to defend the nation, been taken so completely by surprise? Why had they been caught with their defenses down? Why had they been so ill-prepared? Th e people were entitled to answers. Any tragedy, especially one of this magnitude, leads to recriminations and doubts. Many of the individuals involved, directly or indirectly, with the Pearl Harbor disaster must have had second thoughts about whether things might have turned out diff erently if only they had followed another path. Certainly the Pearl Harbor commanders themselves must have wished they could turn back the clock and have a second chance. Admiral Kimmel, for one, confessed after the attack that he wished he “had taken the other course” when off ered the promotion to commander-in-chief. 24 Undoubtedly some Washington offi cials must have also had doubts about whether they had followed the correct path. Suppose they had tried to ameliorate Japanese-U.S. relations instead of aggravating them? Also, given what they knew in Washington about the likelihood of Japanese aggression, could they have done a better job of alerting and provisioning the fi eld commands for defending themselves? At President Roosevelt’s direction, “with the security of the nation at stake,” most of Secretary Knox’s fi ndings on his trip to Hawaii had been withheld from the public. Of course, we 23Ibid., p. 1. 24Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 22, p.359, Kimmel testimony.
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370 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />
the administration was to retain its good name, an <strong>of</strong>fi cial investigation<br />
would have to be arranged to answer such questions.<br />
Less than 24 hours before the Japanese attack, the Navy<br />
Department had announced that the U.S. fl eet was second to<br />
none. Yet now many <strong>of</strong> its ships had been sunk or set ablaze <strong>and</strong><br />
were resting in the mud at the bottom <strong>of</strong> <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>. More<br />
than 2,500 <strong>of</strong>fi cers <strong>and</strong> enlisted men were dead <strong>and</strong> 650 more<br />
were wounded. 23 Why had seasoned Army <strong>and</strong> Navy <strong>of</strong>fi cers, who<br />
had spent lifetimes preparing to defend the nation, been taken so<br />
completely by surprise? Why had they been caught with their<br />
defenses down? Why had they been so ill-prepared? Th e people<br />
were entitled to answers.<br />
Any tragedy, especially one <strong>of</strong> this magnitude, leads to recriminations<br />
<strong>and</strong> doubts. Many <strong>of</strong> the individuals involved, directly or<br />
indirectly, with the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> disaster must have had second<br />
thoughts about whether things might have turned out diff erently<br />
if only they had followed another path. Certainly the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong><br />
comm<strong>and</strong>ers themselves must have wished they could turn back<br />
the clock <strong>and</strong> have a second chance. Admiral Kimmel, for one,<br />
confessed after the attack that he wished he “had taken the other<br />
course” when <strong>of</strong>f ered the promotion to comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-chief. 24<br />
Undoubtedly some Washington <strong>of</strong>fi cials must have also had<br />
doubts about whether they had followed the correct path. Suppose<br />
they had tried to ameliorate Japanese-U.S. relations instead <strong>of</strong><br />
aggravating them? Also, given what they knew in Washington<br />
about the likelihood <strong>of</strong> Japanese aggression, could they have done<br />
a better job <strong>of</strong> alerting <strong>and</strong> provisioning the fi eld comm<strong>and</strong>s for<br />
defending themselves?<br />
At President Roosevelt’s direction, “with the security <strong>of</strong> the<br />
nation at stake,” most <strong>of</strong> Secretary Knox’s fi ndings on his trip<br />
to Hawaii had been withheld from the public. Of course, we<br />
23Ibid., p. 1.<br />
24Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 22, p.359, Kimmel testimony.
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