Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

16 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
in her struggle against Japan. And the Act prevented the United
States from lending support. Out of his desire to aid China, FDR
sought an end to the blanket embargo on shipping arms to belligerent
nations. So in his January 4, 1939, message to Congress,
he launched a campaign for the Act’s repeal: “[O]ur neutrality
laws may operate unevenly and unfairly—may actually give aid
to an aggressor and deny it to the victim.” 21 Congress rejected his
reasoning, and on March 20 the Senate turned down Roosevelt’s
proposal for repeal. FDR repeated his request. Hull also asked for
its repeal.
Britain’s Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s view of the
Far East situation diff ered from that of U.S. offi cials. Chamberlain
did not want to prevent Japan from obtaining the military supplies
she needed for her campaign in China. He recognized “the
actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in
progress” and noted that
as long as that state of aff airs continues to exist, the Japanese
forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of
safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order.
. . . His Majesty’s Government have no intention of countenancing
any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of
the above-mentioned objects by Japanese forces.
Chamberlain urged that “British authorities and British
nationals in China . . . refrain from such acts and measures.” 22
Th e United States and Japan had been trading partners for
years. A commercial treaty permitting and encouraging trade
between the two countries had been in eff ect since 1911. Under its
terms, if one party wanted to terminate the treaty, it was required
to notify the other party six months in advance. In accordance
with that provision, Hull gave the Japanese ambassador notice on
21 Department of State, Peace and War, p. 49.
22 U.S. Congress, Events, pp. 198–99.