Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

366 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Redman, assistant director of Naval Communications. A “whispering
campaign” against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch,
commandant of the 14th Naval District, Hawaii, “was then getting
in full swing.” 7 Noyes told his subordinates
there were altogether too many rumors running around the
Navy Department and people running to the newspapers . . .
getting in the newspapers and on the radio . . . saying all manner
of things against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch
which were not true, that we had to put a stop to . . . these
rumors ourselves, if we knew anything let it die with us . . . and
not originate any rumors ourselves. 8
Th e section heads were given “standing orders not to talk, not
to spread the gossip against Kimmel and Bloch, to keep anything
we had to ourselves until we were called to a witness stand to
testify offi cially.” Th ey were told to “pass that word on to [their]
subordinates.” 9 Th ey should
tell all [their] people not to talk, there was too much loose talk
going around, that there would undoubtedly be an investigation
later and that anybody who had anything to say would be
called before that investigation and permitted to say all they
had to say, if they had anything to say, and if we had written out
anything to destroy it immediately. 10
Anyone who had kept “any notes or anything in writing”
should destroy them immediately. If these papers weren’t
destroyed, there was a chance “somebody might see them and
start something” the note-taker hadn’t intended. 11
7 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, p. 3565.
8 Ibid., p. 3571.
9 Ibid., p. 3566.
10 Ibid., p. 3565.
11 Ibid., p. 3571.