Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Cover-up Begins 365
president had told all he could. “Th e president, as Commander in
Chief,” Walsh continued, “is in the position of having to determine
the line of demarcation between giving as much information
as possible to the American public and of refraining from
giving information that will be comforting to the enemy.” 5
On December 10, Harry S. Truman, then chairman of the
Senate Defense Investigating Committee, announced that his
committee “believes that it should not investigate military and
naval strategy or tactics” and that therefore “no attempt will be
made to inquire into the circumstances of the Japanese surprise
attack at Pearl Harbor Sunday.” 6
Squelching Rumors and
Keeping Wartime Secrets
MAGIC had always been a closely guarded secret, of course,
and now it was most imperative, for the sake of the war eff ort,
to keep the Japanese from knowing that their “Purple” code had
been broken. As the enormity of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe
became apparent, the top Washington offi cials realized more
strongly than ever that they would have to keep the public from
learning how much had been known about Japanese aff airs in
Washington before the attack. Otherwise, they would be asked to
explain why, when they had had so much information, the Army
and Navy in Hawaii had had so little, and why our military forces
in Hawaii had been so poorly prepared. To preserve their own
reputations, therefore, Washington offi cials who had been privy
to MAGIC had to maintain its secrecy.
A meeting to discuss Pearl Harbor was held shortly after the
attack in the offi ce of the director of Naval Communications, presided
over either by Admiral Noyes, director of ONI, or Captain
5 Th e New York Times, December 11, 1941, p. 15.
6 Ibid.