Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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18. The Cover-up Begins The First Week After the Attack in Washington After the attack, the eff orts of U.S. citizens immediately turned in three directions: (1) to avenge the “dastardly act;” (2) to investigate the damage done by the Japanese; and (3) to understand the reasons for the attack. Among top Washington offi cials, civil and military, there was a fourth concern, namely to prevent public knowledge of any acts of commission or omission on their part that might have contributed to the tragedy and to conceal any implication of their possible complicity or responsibility for having provoked the attack. Th e members of Congress were anxious to learn as much as possible about the Pearl Harbor disaster, and they promptly set the wheels in motion to conduct various investigations. Senator David L. Walsh of Massachusetts and Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, chairmen respectively of the Senate and House naval aff airs committees, met with Admiral Stark on December 8. Th ey asked him just how much damage had actually been done to the 363

364 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy ships at Pearl Harbor. 1 Stark answered by giving exact details: Four ships sunk—the Arizona, California, West Virginia, and Olgala—two ships capsized—the Oklahoma and the Utah—and 12 other ships damaged, some heavily. 2 Walsh immediately called a meeting of the Senate Naval Aff airs Committee. Senator Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia and several others advised Walsh to go directly to the president. “[A]sk him to tell the truth to the American people.” Walsh “agreed that the truth should be told, but,” as a former member of the America First Committee who had opposed Roosevelt’s foreign policy, he “was hesitant at fi rst to be the one to go to the president with such a request. After further urging, however, he agreed to do so.” 3 When Walsh asked FDR to tell the American people the truth about Pearl Harbor, the president “fl ew into a rage.” He demanded Walsh divulge the source of his information. Walsh acknowledged that “it came directly from the Navy and Admiral Stark.” Roosevelt responded, “Stark should never have given out the facts about Pearl Harbor,” not even to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Aff airs. Th en referring to the battleships sunk, Roosevelt said, “Why in hell should we admit that they’re sunk? Th ey’re resting in only a couple of feet of water; we’ll raise ‘em!” 4 On December 10, Walsh publicly acknowledged that President Roosevelt must be the judge of information about war operations to be given to the American public. “For that reason, the committee will make no eff ort to question naval offi cials on the extent of ship losses at Pearl Harbor.” He was satisfi ed, he said, that the 1 Th e New York Times, December 10, 1941, p. 7. 2 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 5, p. 2210; part 6, p. 2674. 3 Charles A. Lindbergh, Th e Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970), p. 595. 4 Ibid., pp. 595–96.

364 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

ships at <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>. 1 Stark answered by giving exact details:<br />

Four ships sunk—the Arizona, California, West Virginia, <strong>and</strong><br />

Olgala—two ships capsized—the Oklahoma <strong>and</strong> the Utah—<strong>and</strong><br />

12 other ships damaged, some heavily. 2<br />

Walsh immediately called a meeting <strong>of</strong> the Senate Naval<br />

Aff airs Committee. Senator Harry Flood Byrd <strong>of</strong> Virginia <strong>and</strong><br />

several others advised Walsh to go directly to the president.<br />

“[A]sk him to tell the truth to the American people.” Walsh<br />

“agreed that the truth should be told, but,” as a former member<br />

<strong>of</strong> the America First Committee who had opposed Roosevelt’s<br />

foreign policy, he “was hesitant at fi rst to be the one to go to the<br />

president with such a request. After further urging, however, he<br />

agreed to do so.” 3 When Walsh asked FDR to tell the American<br />

people the truth about <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>, the president “fl ew into a<br />

rage.” He dem<strong>and</strong>ed Walsh divulge the source <strong>of</strong> his information.<br />

Walsh acknowledged that “it came directly from the Navy <strong>and</strong><br />

Admiral Stark.” Roosevelt responded, “Stark should never have<br />

given out the facts about <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>,” not even to the chairman<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Senate Committee on Naval Aff airs. Th en referring to the<br />

battleships sunk, Roosevelt said, “Why in hell should we admit<br />

that they’re sunk? Th ey’re resting in only a couple <strong>of</strong> feet <strong>of</strong> water;<br />

we’ll raise ‘em!” 4<br />

On December 10, Walsh publicly acknowledged that President<br />

Roosevelt must be the judge <strong>of</strong> information about war operations<br />

to be given to the American public. “For that reason, the committee<br />

will make no eff ort to question naval <strong>of</strong>fi cials on the extent<br />

<strong>of</strong> ship losses at <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>.” He was satisfi ed, he said, that the<br />

1 Th e New York Times, December 10, 1941, p. 7.<br />

2 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack. <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:<br />

U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 5, p. 2210; part 6, p. 2674.<br />

3 Charles A. Lindbergh, Th e Wartime Journals <strong>of</strong> Charles A. Lindbergh (New<br />

York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970), p. 595.<br />

4 Ibid., pp. 595–96.

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